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It has been a year since the first Covid-19 case was confirmed in Indonesia, in early
March 2020. At that time, the Indonesian government underestimated the dangers
of Covid-19, which proved fatal since the virus continued to spread gradually to all
Indonesian provinces within a month. At the time of writing, Indonesia is the country
with the highest number of positive cases in Southeast Asia with 1,419,455, even the
Covid-19 death rate in Indonesia is among the highest in the world.
To deal with the spread of Covid-19, Indonesia’s President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo
declared a health emergency status in March 2020 based on Law No. 6 of 2018
on Health Quarantine (Health Quarantine Law). This status has given the Jokowi
administration the authority to limit people’s right to movement, restrict social and
religious activities, and even perform a partial lockdown in particular areas. The
activation of the health emergency status initially brought hope to the people,
because when this status was proclaimed, many Indonesians demanded the
government to impose a lockdown, especially in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital,
which at that time became the focal point of the coronavirus spread in Indonesia.
However, the demand for a lockdown was rejected by the Jokowi
government. Instead, the government chose to implement a large-scale social
restriction (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar) policy in Jakarta, allowing people
to carry out social activities such as working or doing religious prayer in the mosque
with certain limitations. This non-lockdown policy also still permitted Jakarta
residents to travel to other Indonesian regions.
As a result, one month after the first positive case in Jakarta, Covid-19 had spread to
all 34 provinces of Indonesia. The decision not to impose a lockdown on Jakarta as
early as possible was influenced by the government’s view that the implementation
of a lockdown could harm the Indonesian economy. Importantly, the government
believed that it did not have sufficient resources to meet the requirement in the
Health Quarantine Law which obliges the government to fulfil the basic needs of the
people and the livestock during the lockdown.
The government’s decision which emphasises the economic concerns rather than
the health interest of the people has contributed to the significant increase of positive
cases in Indonesia. For now, it seems fair to say that Indonesia is in a ‘do or die’
situation because the increasing number of positive cases has almost collapsed
the health system. In fact, it is not uncommon to find that in the two most populous
islands of Indonesia, Java and Bali, hospitals often refuse to treat Covid-19 patients
due to their insufficient capacity, leaving many untreated Covid-19 patients to die.
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The crisis in the health system has also battered the Indonesian economy. This
shows the Indonesian government’s miscalculation when choosing a strategy to deal
with the pandemic. Apart from the health crisis, this pandemic also brought another
crisis to Indonesia that is no less dangerous, the crisis of constitutional democracy.
Democratic Deconsolidation
At first, the government’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic by activating the health
emergency status in the Health Emergency Law did not seem to create any danger
for Indonesian democracy. Because this status is not included in the category of
state of emergency mechanisms in Article 12 of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution,
it was based on Article 28H of the 1945 Constitution, which guarantees the right
to health. So even though this status has authorised the government to limit social
activities to some degree in the society, it did not cause the suspension of the House
of Representative and other state institutions such as the Constitutional Court and
the Supreme Court, nor did it allow the government to limit freedom of speech and
the flow of information in the public sphere.
However, in reality, the status that seems harmless is often used by the Jokowi
administration to undermine democracy. One example could be seen in the action
of Jokowi’s government through its Police Chief who established a regulation that
empowers the police to prosecute acts defaming the President’s or government
officials’ ability to handle the coronavirus (Telegram Letter number ST/1100/IV/
HUK.7.1/2020).
Such an action blatantly violates the decision of the Indonesian Constitutional
Court which held that the existence of a law that prohibits people from defaming
the President is contrary to Article 28 of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution which
guarantees the right to free speech. As mentioned in our previous post, the
establishment of this regulation did not have any legal basis in the health emergency
status, since this status did not allow the government to restrict the freedom of
speech.
In addition to restricting freedom of expression, the Jokowi government’s attempts
to weaken democracy were also carried out by promulgating several controversial
laws during the pandemic such as the Omnibus Law on Job Creation or the Revision
of the Indonesian Constitutional Court Law. These laws which contain some
controversial issues were formulated by the Jokowi government and the House
of Representatives behind closed doors, and in a very quick deliberation process,
even the deliberation process of the Revision of the Indonesian Constitutional Court
Law was conducted in just two working days. When many members of the general
public, especially university students and labourers, protested against the enactment
of these controversial Laws by staging a demonstration, the Jokowi administration
used the pandemic as an excuse to repress the protest by detaining more than
800 protestors, claiming that such measures were necessary under the health
emergency status to prevent the spread of coronavirus.
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Another action of the government that could put Indonesian democracy in jeopardy
was its decision to involve the military in handling the Covid-19 pandemic. Since
the beginning of the coronavirus outbreak, President Jokowi has placed a number
of military officers in key institutions that determine the policies in the fight against
the pandemic. As a leader of a low quality democracy with the legacy of military
dictatorship, he seems to be unconcerned about the military’s involvement in civil
governance. Once again, such a move did not have any legal basis in the health
emergency status, due to the nature of this status that was meant to prioritise health
concerns rather than security considerations.
Weakening Rights Protection
In addition to undermining democracy, the Jokowi administration seems to have
taken advantage of the uncertainty and less robust supervision of law enforcement
brought by the pandemic to further restrict fundamental rights. The draconian
Information and Electronic Transaction Law (the ITE Law) remains a powerful tool
to silence dissenters since it contains several ambiguous criminal provisions vis-à-
vis hate speech and fomenting violence. For instance, Ravio Patra, an Indonesian
researcher who has severely criticised the Indonesian government’s strategies in
containing the Covid-19 pandemic, was arrested for two days under the ITE Law for
allegedly broadcasting a provocative message that incites hate and violence.
What is strikingly scary about the Patra case is that just a couple of hours before his
arrest on 22 April, his WhatsApp account had been hacked by intruders to send out
messages with the aim of instigating public disorder in the capital. Patra said that he
had never sent any WhatsApp messages to random strangers to organise riots and
civil commotion. Moreover, he likened his arrest to kidnapping because the men that
came to detain him at midnight neither wore uniform nor showed police identification.
In any event, the Patra case could have been a deliberate attempt to silence critics,
with all the necessary steps taken to cast Mr Patra as an agitator whose only aim is
to bring about anarchy.
During the pandemic, the state of academic freedom also worsened. In late May
2020, several law students from Gadjah Mada University who organised a webinar
event to discuss the possibility of presidential impeachment during the Covid-19
crisis due to the failure of the Jokowi government to handle the spread of the
pandemic received death threats through phone calls and WhatsApp messages.
Similar death threats were issued against a constitutional law professor who was
invited to speak at the event. The intruders even went so far as to cancel the
event by hacking the students’ WhatsApp accounts and using them to tell the
participants the event was called off. A rather similar hacking incident also befell
Pandu Riono, an Indonesian professor of epidemiology, whose Twitter account was
also hacked by intruders to post tweets and photos to damage his reputation. The
violation of privacy occurred after the prominent epidemiologist openly criticised
the Covid-19 treatment developed by the military intelligence agency and Airlangga
University, noting that the treatment had not been subjected to sufficiently rigorous
clinical trials. To date, no one has been named as a suspect of all of the hacking
incidents and death threats above.
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But perhaps one of the few positive developments during the pandemic in Indonesia
is the banning of the ultraconservative organisation Islamic Defenders Front (Front
Pembela Islam, FPI) through the enactment of a joint ministerial decree at the end
of 2020. The government cites the involvement of many leaders and members of the
FPI in terrorist and vigilante activities that conflicted with the Pancasila – the national
ideology that many believe promotes unity and diversity – to be the reason behind
the ban. Curiously, Amnesty International Indonesia claims that the ban erodes
civil freedom. The rights organisation appears to neglect the fact that the FPI was
renowned for being an intolerant Muslim organisation whose members repeatedly
committed violence towards the religious minority.
The government’s ban on the FPI came after Rizieq Shihab, its leader, was arrested
for defying Covid-19 restrictions since he held a large religious event attended by
thousands of his followers after returning from his self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia.
The government’s handling of the FPI, however, was not without problems. On 7
December 2020, six members of the FPI were killed by the police in an attempt to
investigate Rizieq Shihab in Kerawang, Indonesia. According to the national police
spokesman, the police officers had to take such action because the slain members
of the FPI attacked the police officers during the investigation process. Yet, the
national human rights institution finds that the killing was unlawful, suggesting that
the case should be brought to a criminal court.
Vaccination as the Only Way Forward?
In Asia, countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have been lauded globally
for their seemingly effective strategies in curbing the spread of the virus without
compromising democracy through a robust system of testing, tracing and isolating,
which have been performed within a transparent and democratic legal framework.
But Indonesia seems to be heading in a very different direction. The Jokowi
government response was not performing a lockdown in the early phase of the
pandemic – even though it had a strong legal basis under the health emergency
status – as well as relying on pseudoscientific claims rather than actual science,
and being reluctant to reveal the correct number of positive cases to the public.
Such inappropriate responses have rendered the government unable to control the
spread of Covid-19 since it is already too late to follow the lessons from other Asian
countries to stop the spread of the disease. Consequently, Covid-19 vaccinations
appear to be the only solution to get out of the pandemic.
As in many low and middle-income countries, Indonesia relies on CoronaVac, a
vaccine developed by Sinovac biotech in China. But following the initial clinical
trials in China, the research trials of the Sinovac vaccine conducted jointly by
Universitas Padjajaran and Bio Farma in Indonesia only included adults aged 18
to 59. Kusnandi Rusmil, the head of the research team, said that the government’s
priority to inoculate the working adults was because these productive people could
work hard so that the country would not have an economic deficit. The statement
was confirmed by the government’s regulation on the Covid-19 vaccination program,
according to which the vaccination is aimed at reaching herd immunity as soon as
possible and reviving the flagging economy. Some commentators have observed
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that such vaccination policy could effectively slow community transmission, given
that younger working adults are generally more active.
Nevertheless, such an unconventional approach to prioritising young people,
police and military officers, public officials, teachers and other people who
contribute to the economy aside from the medical workers would not affect mortality
rates. In particular, older people are at much higher risk of dying than younger
Indonesians due to their high-risk status. So, if the government did not vaccinate
the elderly because of their supposed limited economic value and their age, it would
constitute discrimination, which is prohibited under Article 28I(2) of the Indonesian
Constitution.
Since mid-January 2021, Indonesia has started its ambitious plan to vaccinate
181 million of its population in 15 months, with Jokowi being the first to receive
the vaccine jab. The mass vaccination program began after the health authorities
declared the Sinovac vaccine was 65.3 per cent effective. The Economist
Intelligence Unit estimates more than 60 per cent of the population will have been
vaccinated in Indonesia by Q3 of 2023. However, almost two months after the rollout
of the Covid-19 vaccination programme began, the average doses administered
per day is only about 200,000. At this rate, Indonesians will, unfortunately, still have
to wait for more than five years until the vaccination programme is finished. More
recently, the Jokowi administration issued a presidential regulation that requires
targeted individuals to take up the vaccine. The regulation allows government
institutions at the national and local levels to stop social assistance, government
services and impose fines on anyone who refuses vaccination. While mandatory
vaccination could legitimately be justified as a means to protect public health, the
government must ensure that imposing sanctions on individuals for not taking
the vaccine is carried out on a case-by-case basis, and the sanction given is
proportional. Careful consideration is crucial because the vaccine might not be
suitable for particular individuals who demonstrate that the vaccine may adversely
affect their health, and because millions of Indonesians still live in poverty, which
makes them unable to pay the fines.
In the end, it remains to be seen whether the Jokowi government will continue to
compromise democracy and the fundamental rights of its citizens in its effort in
handling the Covid-19 pandemic.
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